CRABB, District Judge.
This really is a civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. В§ 1983. Plaintiff The cash advance shop of Wisconsin contends that defendant City of Madison has enacted an ordinance that violates plaintiff’s legal rights to equal security and due procedure and is unconstitutionally obscure. In addition, plaintiff contends that the ordinance is preempted by state legislation.
Whenever plaintiff filed its problem, it desired an initial injunction to avoid defendant from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance.
Defendant reacted towards the movement and presented a movement for summary judgment at the time that is same asserting that the appropriate concepts determining the motions had been exactly the same. Defendant asked that its movement for summary judgment be addressed without enabling plaintiff time for breakthrough, arguing that any breakthrough will be unneeded. I agreed that development will never help plaintiff (because legislative choices are “not susceptible to courtroom factfinding and will be predicated on logical conjecture unsupported by proof or empirical data,” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)), and offered its counsel a way to advise the court whether he desired the opportunity for extra briefing; he had written to your court on August 12, 2004, to state that extra briefing wouldn’t be necessary and therefore the court should go to determine the movement.
We conclude that defendant’s movement for summary judgment must certanly be given because plaintiff cannot show that defendant lacked any basis that is rational legislating the nighttime closing of pay day loan shops. Without this kind of showing, plaintiff cannot be successful on its declare that it had been rejected substantive due process that it was denied equal protection or. The clear wording associated with the ordinance defeats plaintiff’s declare that it really is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, plaintiff does not have any help because of its contention that the ordinance is preempted by state legislation.
For the intended purpose of determining this movement, we find through the findings of reality proposed by the events relating to the two motions that the following facts are material and undisputed.
Plaintiff The cash advance shop of Wisconsin, Inc., d/b/a Madison’s money Express, is a Wisconsin company along with its major office in Chicago, Illinois. Defendant City of Madison is just a physical human body corporate and politic that will sue and stay sued.
Plaintiff is an economic solutions business that runs five branches in Madison, Wisconsin. On November 7, 2003, it launched a brand new center at 2722 East Washington Avenue. The facility was open 24 hours a day, seven days a week and was the only 24-hour business of its type in Madison as of the time of the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction.
Each of plaintiff’s pay day loan clients have actually checking reports and a big percentage of their check cashing clients have actually bank records.
Plaintiff provides a wide range of solutions, including short-term certified loans referred to as “payday loans,” a foreign exchange and look cashing procedure, notary solutions, bill investing and facsimile and copy services. Plaintiff sells stamps, envelopes and coach passes and keeps A atm that is stand-alone in lobby.
*803 Plaintiff is certified by the Wisconsin Department of finance institutions to help make short-term certified loans. In a normal deal, a debtor presents a paycheck stub, photo recognition and a recently available bank declaration, completes that loan application and submits a post-dated check. Plaintiff completes a note as well as other loan papers and makes particular disclosures to the consumer. It holds the post-dated check before the loan comes due and thereafter is applicable the check to cover the loan off unless the client will pay the mortgage in complete before this has come due. Plaintiff fees $22 for every single $100 lent for a two-week licensed loan.